The Return of German Power
Mateusz MORAWIECKI
If Germany truly commits 5% of its GDP to rearmament, it will mark not only the largest mobilisation since the Cold War but also a turning point in the European balance of power.
.Recent Polish debates concerning Germany have been shaped by two developments: the systematic transfer of illegal immigrants across the Polish border by German police and the deeply contentious Berlin memorial for Polish victims of the Second World War. The Polish government has given in entirely on both counts. Yet, to understand the current situation in Germany, we must turn to Wolfgang Münchau’s Kaputt, an insightful analysis of the deterioration of the German economic model. Münchau masterfully unveils the illusions that once sustained Germany’s power: low-cost Russian energy, booming exports to China, traditional manufacturing and fiscal dogmatism. All these observations are accurate. However, are they not arriving too late, now that Germany has already begun promoting a new economic agenda?
As I read Münchau’s treatise, one concept in particular lingered with me – incidentally, it was an idea firmly grounded in Germany’s intellectual heritage. Hegel once wrote that ‘the owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk’. In other words, wisdom emerges only after the event under scrutiny has drawn to a close. I can’t escape the feeling that this is precisely what afflicts Kaputt, as the book seems to depict – quite aptly – a world that is already fading into the past. Before our very eyes, something new is unfolding: Germany’s industrial reawakening and, more significantly, its military resurgence. Berlin is emerging from decades of armament minimalism, preparing to reassert itself as a genuine force. This is no longer mere symbolism or public relations theatre but a systemic shift that requires careful consideration – and thorough understanding lest history repeats itself.
From Passivity to Counter-Offensive
.The war in Ukraine has prompted European governments to take a hard look at their defensive capabilities. A wave of rearmament has swept the continent as nations rush to compensate for decades of strategic neglect. The public’s perception of military issues has also changed significantly, resulting in a broad consensus in favour of increased national defence capabilities. With growing threats from Russia and China, the need for investment in defence and industry is now clearer than ever. Even long-standing pacifist societies are openly altering their approach. In such circumstances, the slightest tremors may trigger landslides, shaking the very foundations of mutual trust.
Initially passive in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and shamefully anticipating Kyiv’s fall and a return to ‘business as usual’, Germany’s political elite has now changed course. The goal: to rebuild its army and, in doing so, reassert its influence across Europe and within NATO. After the Second World War, our western neighbours sought to distance themselves from their criminal past in an effort to rebuild an international image that was no longer based on rearmament and strengthening their army. That era, however, is coming to a close. Recent polls show that 76% of Germans now support increased funding for the Bundeswehr. A comparable majority, 74%, express doubt that the United States would come to their military aid. No excuse is too small. With the automotive sector in decline, Germany’s political and business classes are engaged in intense deliberations about how to restore the country’s industrial might.
The arguments laid out in Kaputt have reverberated strongly within Polish discourse. Yet we must not be lulled into thinking that our western neighbour is weak or losing the will to pursue its interests. On the contrary, Germany remains one of the most powerful players in global and European affairs, despite its military frailty resulting from past neglect. And today, the country’s leaders are determined to reverse the consequences of its earlier choices.
Following the Cold War, Germany – hardly having any other option – adopted Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and gradually dismantled its armed forces, reaping the benefits of peace. Budgets were redirected to bolster the welfare state, while defence spending was curtailed and modernisation postponed. The Bundeswehr was steadily weakened on multiple fronts. Current estimates place the army’s strength at around 180,000 personnel, down from 490,000 in 1988.
Even as recently as 2014, Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that Germany needed no increase in defence spending, claiming that the Bundeswehr was sufficient as it was. At the time, military expenditure hovered around 1.3 (approximately €35 billion, i.e. less than Poland’s defence budget in 2023). Berlin focused on reducing its troops while increasing specialisation. The 2020 budget anticipated only a marginal increase, followed by a reduction to 1.25% of GDP by 2023 – despite NATO’s 2014 commitment in Wales to spend a minimum of 2%. Germany’s response to the war in Ukraine was the ultimate expression of this complacency: a symbolic offer of 5,000 helmets to Kyiv and an implicit expectation of Ukrainian surrender. This gesture will long be remembered as one of the greatest embarrassments in modern German history. Bureaucracy, procurement failures and poor internal communication compounded the Bundeswehr’s woes, leaving it in no state for combat readiness.
A shift began with the appointment of Boris Pistorius (SPD) as defence minister in January 2023. Defying his party’s sceptics, including those within the SPD itself, he proposed reforms to the Bundeswehr and the reintroduction of conscription. It was a controversial idea, given the shortage of infrastructure and the reluctance of young Germans. Nevertheless, a dedicated task force has been formed to expand troop numbers to 203,000. Defence spending has also increased, from 1.37% of GDP in 2022 to 2% in 2024, aided by a €100 billion fund created in 2022. In 2024, the Bundestag approved 97 military contracts worth €45 billion. Overall defence expenditure reached $88.5 billion – 28% more than in the previous year. But this is merely the beginning of Germany’s rearmament campaign.
Berlin Raises the Anchor
.At the recent NATO summit in The Hague, member states committed to a new defence target of 5% of GDP. A historic pledge, albeit largely nominal at this stage. History shows that political goals can easily be achieved through creative accounting, such as adding military pensions or administration costs, just to meet targets. One thing is certain – if Germany truly commits 5% of its GDP to rearmament, it will mark not only the largest mobilisation since the Cold War but also a turning point in the European balance of power. The return of German military force will cease to be hypothetical – it will become inevitable.
Germany is preparing for this methodically, lifting fiscal constraints, activating special funds, and reorienting the state towards wartime economic mobilisation.
A constitutional amendment passed by the Bundestag in March allows for increased defence spending, overriding prior debt restrictions. This was done by introducing special exceptions to the so-called budget anchor, a mechanism that limited the deficit and controlled public spending. This system was integrated into the German Basic Law following the financial crisis, during which the federal government introduced multi-billion-dollar bailout programmes that placed a significant burden on the state budget and increased debt levels. These ‘sacred’ rules have just been completely revised.
For the first time, individual Länder may also incur debt, a privilege previously reserved for the federal government. Crucially, the new rules permit defence borrowing that exceeds the prior deficit cap of 0.35% of gross national income – a remarkably strict threshold, especially when compared to the EU’s own 3% rule. In practice, this means defence spending over 1% of GDP may now be financed via loans, unfettered by budgetary limitations. This paves the way for Germany to substantially increase its defence spending in the coming years.
As a result, Germany has announced a €500 billion special fund, to be invested over the next decade in defence and infrastructure. The goal is to catch up with the military sector and enhance the country’s defence capabilities. It will also foster a new approach to rebuilding German industry. The fund’s primary objective, as explained by German officials, is to rectify long-standing gaps in military investment. This is the largest arms programme in the history of a reunified Germany, providing on average an additional €50 billion per year for the modernisation of the armed forces – more than the entire Polish defence budget this year.
There is little doubt that Germany seeks to build a world-class military – one of the largest on the continent. The scale of investment in defence development indicates this transformation could be completed in ten years, not several decades. Should the federal government make certain choices, this may happen even sooner. Berlin has made no secret of its ambition to assume a more important role in NATO and a greater responsibility for European security, especially in Central Europe. If sustained, this course will reshape Europe’s geopolitical security architecture.
While these efforts may support collective defence, they are far from altruistic. Germany’s focus remains on its own economic and industrial strength, as well as its long-term strategic goals and political pursuits. For Germany, the focus is twofold: maintaining economic growth to fund military modernisation and achieving a united European defence system, including a European army. At the heart of both objectives lies a robust arms industry – the strongest in Europe.
Rheinmetall leads the charge, producing Leopard 2 tanks, ammunition and air defence systems. The corporation is dynamically scaling its manufacturing capacity; a €600 million investment in 2025 will facilitate the annual production of 350,000 artillery shells. In 2024, it made record profits and secured an order book of €55 billion. It is also noteworthy that the company has recently established a partnership with American defence innovator Anduril, an emblem of an AI-driven arms manufacturing model. Contrary to Münchau’s claims, Germany is not giving up on its ambitions – it is leapfrogging towards the technological frontier. Meanwhile, decision-makers in Warsaw are basically ignoring firms such as Anduril and Palantir when drawing up their strategic maps.
In addition to Rheinmetall, other significant participants are TKMS (naval vessels), Hensoldt (sensors and radars for battlefield surveillance), closely monitoring the Ukrainian conflict), and Diehl Defence (precision-guided munitions). Each is adapting rapidly to the lessons of the Ukrainian battlefield. The scale of public investment translates into tangible benefits, with every €1 billion invested generating €1.23 billion in output. The sector now employs nearly 400,000 people. In 2024, German arms exports reached a record €13.2 billion.
Secure long-term contracts and stable funding enable each mentioned company to pursue long-range investment strategies and advanced projects, particularly in emerging technologies. This will generate more jobs and higher revenues for the federal states and the federal budget through increased tax income. It will also enhance the competitiveness of German enterprises within the European market, significantly boosting demand for a broad range of industrial products.
Germany understands full well that the modernisation of its defence capabilities fuels its economy, that dual-use goods may serve as a powerful engine of economic growth and that stable contracts and rising exports bolster the competitiveness of its national firms across the European market. In the longer term, Berlin will shape EU defence policy with even greater vigour – not only through diplomatic initiatives but also through intensive lobbying within EU institutions. Germany is already successfully promoting solutions that benefit its own industry, particularly in defence product certification, public procurement and technical standards. These efforts will undoubtedly grow, with Berlin using the pretext of community interests to solidify the German industry’s central role in European security.
NATO-bis?
.With a powerful arms industry and a military undergoing modernisation, Germany’s influence may propel the development of a supplementary European military structure akin to NATO. While ostensibly designed to address community needs, this project would actually consolidate the political influence of Berlin (and Paris) and marginalise the role of smaller member states. One doesn’t need to look far for parallels; the introduction of the single currency saw a similar dynamic, with Germany reaping the greatest rewards. This is a deeply perilous development for Poland and the states of the Intermarium. It’s undeniable that a European army would be dominated by the Berlin-Paris axis, leaving other members with secondary or even tertiary roles. That fact alone should set off alarm bells in Warsaw, Vilnius, Prague and Bucharest.
For now, Berlin lacks the industrial capacity to fully realise such a project. Carbon leakage and deindustrialisation – closely linked to the missteps of Energiewende and the Green Deal – have decimated German industry and are now beginning to strike at the foundations of German ordoliberalism: the Mittelstand. Nevertheless, the path forward is evident – to build a dependency framework that will fully integrate other European countries into Germany’s supply chains, decision-making processes and defence capabilities. Should American engagement falter and a European army emerge, this would grant Germany real influence over the deployment of European allied forces, decisions on intervention and the shaping of the continent’s security policy. This sadly mirrors the Polish government’s current strategy, which seems more focused on pushing the U.S. out of Europe than on meaningfully strengthening transatlantic relations.
Germany’s defence spending is increasing dramatically, propelling the country to the vanguard of Western Europe. The question is: how soon might it match the real operational capabilities of France or the United Kingdom? I expect it to happen shortly. When could Germany potentially surpass these countries and re-emerge as a major military power? Given the current determination of Germany’s political class, I foresee this happening within a decade. That is the long-term objective – and a turning point in the continental balance of power. However, the existing world order could crumble at any time, and a powerful – regardless of who commands it – may serve not only as a shield but also as a tool of political or economic coercion.
For too long, Europe has been under the illusion of democracy’s permanence. The truth is that crises, disinformation and social unrest could easily cause its downfall. Rising tensions, manipulation of public opinion and the activities of external actors and vested interests may radically alter the course of history. In such a world, alliances are not eternal, and shared adversaries are not a necessity. As British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston once said, ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’
A History We Cannot Repeat
.Military equipment is not purchased to gather dust. The scale of investment – public and private – suggests not caution but ambition. The question is: to what end? Who will wield this power, and in whose interest?
History teaches us that industrial–military potential can be employed equally for defensive purposes and exertion, whether domestic or foreign. The significant and recent expansion of Germany’s armaments sector is not occurring in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is maturing amidst a climate of political turbulence and growing support for parties that reject the post-war consensus. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) – an increasingly powerful political party in eastern Germany that is currently leading the polls in some states – openly challenges the very foundations of Berlin’s post-war policies towards Russia, the EU, NATO and the United States.
The unsettling parallel to the early 1930s is impossible to ignore. Popular perception frequently portrays Hitler’s ascent as a democratic mandate, with the year 1933 marked as a symbolic turning point. In reality, it was an oligarchic coup, effected by the hands of elites, heavy industry and the banking sector, which saw the NSDAP as a useful tool in the fight against communism and the disintegration of the state. Éric Vuillard’s The Order of the Day serves as a symbolic representation of this process, detailing Hitler’s alliances with German industrialists, the bourgeoisie and segments of the aristocracy – that is, a significant portion of the nation’s elite. Business was to support the brownshirts’ march to power. The rest, as we well know, is history – but a history that must not be repeated.
This is why the growing tolerance of economic elites for flirtation with radicalism is so troubling. Major German companies are no longer ruling out cooperation with the AfD. At the same time, state institutions are being strengthened – institutions which, in the future, could fall under the control of extremist forces. This is all the more pertinent given that current social fatigue, rising inequality and geopolitical anxiety are creating conditions much like those of a century ago.
The recurring statements of that party’s politicians – statements that treat Poland in purely instrumental terms, and in some cases deny it political subjectivity altogether – are openly grounded in historical revisionism. The application of the term ‘Middle Germany’ to the former GDR has elicited questions about Ms Weidel’s views on the regions further east. More alarming are the controversial statements made by Alexander Gauland, who deemed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact a justifiable decision by Stalin, purportedly coerced by interwar Polish policy. These positions suggest a credible threat: the resurgence of a Moscow-Berlin axis, to the detriment of Poland and other Intermarium states.
Looming in the background is the Russian factor. The strength of mutual entanglements between Germany and Russia has always been considerable, regardless of who held power in Berlin. For decades, Moscow has exerted an influence on German politics through economic, media and social channels. Russian intelligence effectively infiltrated strategic energy firms, now actively disseminating narratives designed to drive a wedge between Germany and the United States. Should pro-Russian or Kremlin-ambivalent elements seize power in Berlin, the entire continent would find itself in peril.
Germany may yet return to close cooperation with a colonial, imperial Russia. Recognising that we now live in an age of testing boundaries and probing how far one can go must be at the forefront of every European statesman’s mind – lest we repeat the same fatal mistakes. It brings to mind another lesson that history has taught us all too well: a powerful army in the wrong hands may become a sword, not a shield. Hence, the question of Germany’s arms industry is not merely technical or economic. At its core, it is a question about the political future of Germany, Poland and Europe. Who will have access to the power that the German state is currently working so hard to rebuild? Europe’s history is filled with examples of powerful war machines that have been used to undermine democracy, wage war against neighbouring countries and disrupt peace. We’ve been burned by this mistake too often to be naïve today.
History teaches humility in the face of what only yesterday seemed impossible. Germany is no longer a nation bound by pacifist principles. It has taken its first decisive steps towards building military might. People who don’t see this live in a world of illusion and wishful political thinking – a ‘world of yesterday’, as Stefan Zweig called it. The stakes today extend far beyond the traditional definitions of security and sovereignty. The ongoing game is a battle for power in the rapidly changing international landscape. It is a competition between medium-sized states and a resurgence of major powers, all vying for industrial strength and global prestige. To paraphrase a Latin maxim: if you want peace, prepare for war and scan the horizon in all directions.
.We must therefore ask ourselves whether the remilitarisation of Germany lies in Poland’s best interests. Should we greet the construction of a powerful army just across our western frontier – one that affects so many sectors – with chronicler’s stoicism? Let us bear in mind that states’ strategies and policies are always planned decades in advance and that the pendulum of history swings in both directions as it cycles through time.
